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Abstract-Elliptic curve cryptosystems have been the focus of
much attention as the benefits of elliptic curve cryptography
(ECC) become many such as a small software footprint, low
hardware implementation costs, linear scalability, low
bandwidth requirements, and high performance, which have
been drawn great attentions in particular wireless sensor
networks. Many papers have investigated various algorithms
for fast calculations due to the wireless sensor networks are
always limited power energy, constrict computing capacity,
and other tighten resources such as storage capacity limited,
etc. In this paper a novel algorithm is first presented , with
which the hamming weight will be minimized therefore the
calculation cost will be dropped and the cryptographic
algorithm has gained the natures of ECC. This makes ECC
more suitable for use in constrained environment such as
mobile sensor information applications, where computing
resources and power availability are limited. The final results
show that, in comparison with popular algorithms, such as
NAF, MOF and complementary algorithms, the proposed
algorithm significantly improved (average about 12.5%
decreasing comparing with complementary algorithms).
Keywords-elliptic curve crytographic;public key; fast
calculations in ECC, complementary recoding, 1 's complement
ofbinary numbers.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless networks, in particular sensor networks, have
been experiencing an explosive growth in recent years and
offered attractive flexibility to network operators and users.
Security in communication networks has become
increasingly prominent and its key technology cryptography
technology develops rapidly.
Elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) has been known for
public-key cryptography purposes [1], [2], which is
independently introduced by Koblitz and Miller in 80's has
attracted increasing attention in recent years due to its linear
scalability, a small software footprint, low hardware
implementation cost, low bandwidth requirement, and high
device performance. ECC that relies on the difficulty of
elliptic curve discrete logarithmic problem (ECDLP) based
cryptosystem is an efficient public key cryptosystem, which
is more suitable for limited environments.
Normally the structure of an ECC operation involves
three computational levels, namely scalar multiplication
algorithm, point arithmetic and field arithmetic [3] mainly
focus on improvements at the point arithmetic level to
decreasing the time of ECC scalar multiplication. For point
adding, a combination of projective and affme coordinates,
i.e. mixed addition [4], has offered the efficient formulae.
In the case of adding points in the same coordinate system,
the required formula is more costly and is referred to as
general addition. Recently, some approaches to compute
faster scalar multiplications, such as double-base chain [5],
ternary/binary method [6] have introduced tripling as a new
point operation. Also there are many papers discussed the
implementation over various situations [7-14] to try to get a
better results. It is well known that ECC with a key size of
160 bits provides the same level of security as RSA, DSA,
and DH with a key size of 1024 bits. The most important
issue is that the standard bodies such as IEEE [16], [20],
ISO, IETF etc. have accepted ECC as an alternative, efficient
public key cryptosystem. It is the fact that the benefits of
elliptic curve cryptography becomes an important member in
the public key cryptosystem family with it's a small software
footprint, low hardware implementation costs, linear
scalability, low bandwidth requirements and high
performance.
The most expensive operation in elliptic curve based
cryptographic protocol is the scalar multiplication. There are
many papers investigated this issue, such as ECC using
modified complementary [15], binary method [16], non-
adjacent form (NAF) [11], and mutual opposite form (MOF)
[18] and complements method [19], etc.
In fact for the various algorithms the target is to reduce
the expensive operation-scalar multiplication, which can be
expressed by decreasing so-called Hamming weight of
binary representation if the base is used in binary base that
the sensor networks are widely used, which we are focusing
on in this paper.
In this paper a novel algorithm is presented with hybrid
efficient complementary and l's complement of binary
numbers to significantly minimize Hamming weight, which
makes the calculations significantly decreasing. The fmal
results with this proposed algorithm compared with the listed
methods on [15] the average calculating time estimated to be
decreased about 12.5%. Even there is a room to be further
improved for the proposed algorithm in the next step for our
future research project.
The next section will discuss the general tradition elliptic
curve cryptography algorithm and then some related
algorithms that were focusing on decreasing the calculations
over ECC will be followed. After that, we are going to show
the advantages and drawbacks for the complementary
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constants a and b are non negative integers smaller than the
prime number p and as here we used "mod p", so equation
(3) should be read as:
4a3+27bzmod p:j.O (6)
For each value ofx one needs to determine whether or not it
is a quadratic residue. If it is the case, then there are two
values in the elliptic group . If not, then the point is not in the
elliptic Ep(a,b) group .
When we fixed a prime number, p and then fixed
constants a and b we can have the Galois Field Ep(a,b)
group.
algorithm and l's complement of binary numbers algorithm,
which leads the next section, the novel algorithm that
significantly decreases the Hamming weight. The final
section, conclusion, presents the comparison results to show
the proposed algorithm at current level about average 12.5%
calculation time is saved.
II. TRADITIONAL PROTOCOL IN ECC
An elliptic curve is the set of solutions of an equation of
the form can be shown as below:
y 2 + axy + by = x 3 + cx 2 + dx + e (1)
where a, b, C, d, and e, are real numbers.
A special addition operation is defined over elliptic
curves and this with the inclusion of a point o, called point at
infinity. If three points are on a line intersecting an elliptic
curve, then their sum is equal to this point at infinity o,
which acts as the identity element for this addition operation.
Sometimes the general equation (1) can be referred as
Weierstrass equation as shown in (2):
y2 =x 3 + ax + b (2)
If we wanted use a elliptic curve to be used for cryptography
the necessary condition is the curve is not singular, i.e. the
discriminant ofpolynomialf{x) = x3+ax+b :
4a 3 + 27b 2 :;t: 0 (3)
Figures 1 and 2 show the two elliptic curves are
y2 = x
3 + 2x + 5 (4)
and
An elliptic group over the Galois Field Ep(a,b) is
obtained by computing x3 + ax + b mod p for 0 :s x < p. The
y2 = x 3 - 2x +1 (5)
It is noted that they are in different "shapes', Figure 1 is only
part as the whole elliptic curve but Figure 2 has two part as
the whole elliptic curve. However, we can check those two
equations meet equation (3).
Figure 2. Elliptic curve eqaution (5)
For example , let the points P =(x" YI) and Q (xz,Yz)be in
the elliptic group Ep(a,b) group and tJbe the point at infinity.
The rules for addition over the elliptic group Ep(a,b) are :
(1) P+tJ = tJ+ P = P
(2) IfXz = XI and yz = -y\, that is P(x\, YI) and Q = (xz,yz)
= (xrYI) = -P, that is the case: P+Q = tJ.
(3) If Q:f -P, then their sum P+Q = (X3,Y3) is given by;
x3 = A? - XI - x2 mod p
Y3 = A(XI - x3) - YI mod p (7)
where A, == 1::=~: if P *Q (8)
3x: +a if P=Q
2YI
In order to express our new protocol of the hidden
generator point we, without losing generality, use an
example for the above description. Let's assume p = 23 and
a = 1 and b =1, i.e. the equation becomes: 1= x3+x +1 mod
23. We have 4d +27bz mod 23 = 8 :j. O. Now we need to
determine ifI is in the set of quadratic residues or not.
Now let's have a closer look at the elliptic group Ep(a,b).
In our above example, we pick the prime number p = 23 (it is
noted that this is only for explaining the new protocol, in real
life the p is bigger than this) , we have quadratic residues
643o
Figure 1. Elliptic curves equation (4)
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group (p-l )/2 = 11 and for this group the Ep{ a,b) can be
shown as below:
(0,1) (0,22) (~7) (1,16) (3,10) (3,13) (4,0)
(5,4) (5,1~ (6,4) (6,19) (7) 1) (7,12) (9,7)
E;iW= (9,1~ (l\3) (11,20)(12,4) (l2,19)(1~7) (1~1~
(1 ~3) (1 ~2Q (18,3) (18,20) (19,5) (1Ql~
(9)
which includes the point (4, 0) corresponding to the single
value y = O. As an example, paper [22] discussed this in
details regarding to the hidden generator point for protecting
from man-in-the middle.
The elliptic curve cryptography can be used to encrypt
plaintext messages, M, into ciphertexts. The plaintext
message M is encoded into a point PM from the fmite set of
points in the elliptic group, Ep{ a,b). First step consists in
choosing a generator point, Ge Ep{a,b), such that the
smallest value of n for which nG = () is a very large prime
number. Normally the traditional ECC protocol is let the
elliptic group Ep{a,b) and the generator point G be in public.
Each user select a private key, say n»: < n and compute the
public key PA as PA = nAG. Then, the case becomes
encrypting the message point PM for the partner, say from
Alice to Bob. So Alice (A) chose a random integer k and
computes the ciphertext pair of points Pc using Bob's public
key PB:
Pc = [(kG), (PM + kPB)] (9)
Bob received the ciphertext pair of points, Pc then multiplies
the first point, (kG) with his private key, nB, and then adds
the result to the second point in the ciphertext pair of points
as shown below:
(PM + kPB) - [nB(kG)] = PM (10)
which is the plaintext point, corresponding to the plaintext
message M. It is noted that only Bob can obtain retrieve the
plantext information PM by the private key nB. The
cryptographic strength of ECC lies in the difficulty for a
cryptanalyst to determine the secret random number k from
kP and P itself. The fast method to solve this problem is
known as the elliptic curve logarithm problem (ECLP).
III. SPEEDING UP ALGORITHMS OVER ECC
The scalar multiplication is very expensive operation in
elliptic curve based cryptographic protocol. Hence, the
speed of scalar multiplication plays an important role in the
efficient system.
Scalar multiplication is the computation of the form Q =
kP, where P and Q are the elliptic curve points (as figures
shown) and k is an integer. It can be obtained by repeated
elliptic curve point addition and doubling operations. In the
binary algorithms [16], the integer k is represented as
/-1
k = Lkj2
j
where kj e{O,I}, (II)
j=O
which scans the bits of k either from left-to-right or right-to-
left. The cost of multiplication depends on the length of the
binary representation of k and the number of Harming weight
of scalar representation in this representation. If the
representation {kn-l .. .kO)2 with kn-ltO then the number of
doubling operation is (n-l). In an average, binary algorithm
requires (n-l) doublings and {n-l)/2 additions. For example,
k= 1778, then k= (11011111100)2 so computation of 1778 P
requires 10 doublings and 5 additions.
It is well known that a algorithm called non-adjacent
form (NAF) [17], based on the fact that k is represented as
/-1
k = Lkj2
j
, with kj e{-I,O,I}. which using three digits
j=O
{O, 1, -I} -radix 2 representation and this conversion is taken
from right-to-Ieft. The average Hamming weight of signed
binary representation is n/3 and it has the lower Hamming
weight than the binary algorithm. However, it is noted the
Hamming weight is one of keys to handle computation load,
for example, k = 255, or (11111111)2, computation of 255P
requires 7 point additions, but if it is transformed by
{10000000-I)P, which is 256P-P, only one addition is
required.
There is another algorithm needs to be mentioned, the
mutual opposite form (MOF) [18], which converts the binary
string to MOF from the most significant bit efficiently. The
n-bit binary string k is converted into a signed binary string
by mk = 2k - k, with "-" stands for a bit subtraction. The
conversion of MOF representation of an integer is highly
flexible because conversion can be made either from right-
to-left or left-to-right. The output of MOF is comparable
efficiency with out ofNAF as shown in [15].
IV. COMPLEMENTARY AND THE I's COMPLEMENT OF
BINARY NUMBERS
As above described it is clearly to see that every
mentioned algorithm makes the target that decreasing the
Hamming weight to increase the efficient computation over
ECC. As [15] shown that the MOF and complementary
algorithms are almost the same level in terms of computation
costs we may take complementary algorithm as part of
hybrid algorithm as shown below. But we need to present
the so-called "the l' s complement of binary numbers"
described by Gillie [21].
The l's complement of any binary number may be found
by the following equation [21]:
C1 =(2a -1) - k (12)
Or k =(2 a -1) - C1 (13)
where C1 = 1's complement of the number
a = number ofdigits to be handled by the computer
k = binary number whose 1's complement
As an example, let k =1788, or k = (11011111100)2 in its
binary form. C1 = 1's Complement of the number of k and
the a in this example it is in binary form is 11. Therefore
from the equation (12) we have:
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V. CONCLUSION
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